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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a 
Statutory corporation, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
REX H. COX and WILMINA COX, 
his wife, 
Defendants-Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9844 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Statement of the nature of the case and disposition 
in lower court are adequate as stated in appellant's brief. 
RELIEF SO·UGHT O·N APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks sustainment of the lower court's order 
denying defendant Rex H. Cox' motion to set aside the 
default judgment. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts should be considered in addi-
tion to the statements made in defendants' brief. On or 
about the 20th day of February, 1961, defendants gave a 
written offer to the plaintiff for the sale to plaintiff of 
the property described in the Complaint for the sum of 
$43,500.00. (R. 72-Ex 1-D). This offer was rejected 
and a counter offer of $40,000.00 made by the plaintiff, 
and on the 17th day of April, 1961, defendants, by writ-
ten communication, rejected the said offer of $40,000.00 
made by the plaintiff and stated, ((We wish to compromise 
and accept the sum of $42,000.00." This was signed by 
((Rex H. Cox". (R. 72, Ex 2-D). 
After numerous attempts to have defendants convey 
said property, the plaintiff, through one of its attorneys, 
tendered to the defendants a check (R. 34) for the pur-
chase price of $42,000.00 less revenue stamps and prorated 
taxes. Defendants refused to execute the deed. There-
after, the plaintiff's attorney informed the defendant, 
Rex H. Cox, that in the event a transaction could not be 
completed amicably, he was instructed by the Board of 
Education of the Granite School District to bring suit 
against the defendants. The defendant, Rex H. Cox, 
informed this attorney for plaintiff that he should go 
ahead and bring suit. (R. 3 5). Complaint was filed 
August 31, 1962 and a copy of the Summons together 
with a copy of the Complaint was served personally upon 
the defendants Wilmina Cox and Rex H. Cox by leaving a 
copy with Wilmina Cox, the defendant's wife (R. 6). 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED 
ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MO~TIO~N OF 
DEFENDANT REX H. cox TOI SET ASIDE DE-
FAULT JUDGMENT. 
As stated by the court in Quely vs. Willardson, 3 5 
Utah 414, 100 P 930,: 
HAll that the court could oass on at the hearing on 
the motion was whether ;ppellants had presented 
a meritorious defense in their answer and whether 
they had shown sufficient excuse for not presenting 
such defense at the proper time." 
Defendant Rex H. Cox does not comply with either re-
quirement. No defense was presented and no proposed 
answer for defendant Rex H. Cox has been submitted. 
Defendant Rex H. Cox admits that he was told by 
plaintiff's attorney that plaintiff had instructed him to 
bring suit if the defendants refused to execute the deed 
tendered. (R. 3 5). He admitted that he saw the Sum-
mons and the copy of the Complaint that were served on 
him (R. 3 5, 44, 45 and 46) and admitted that he did not 
neglect but he just refused to do anything about this mat-
ter by asking advice of an attorney or otherwise and at no 
time had any intention to do so. (R. 35, 44,45 and 46). De-
fendant further admits that he knew that there had been 
two letters sent by certified mail, returned receipt re-
quested, that had been waiting in the post office, addressed 
to him and his wife, and had failed, neglected, and refused 
to pick up the said letters. (R. 3 5 and 3 6). All of this 
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seems to fit in with the pattern of defendant's previous 
conduct in which he agreed to sell the property but did 
nothing and refused to complete the transaction. At the 
time of service, defendant Rex H. Cox discussed this 
matter with his wife and, according to his testimony, 
ui smoothed it over and made her feel better about it." 
(R. 44). This defendant's inaction was deliberate. The 
court summed it up in the following words, ((Accordingly, 
I can't believe his testimony and I think what he did in 
failing to make his appearance or get counsel and respond 
to the Summons was deliberate on his part." (R. 54). 
Although the State of Utah has always had a very 
liberal policy in setting aside default judgments, all cases 
have required a showing of inadvertance, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect, none of which appears in this case. 
In the case of Chrysler vs. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 
303 P2nd 995, the court says in part as follows: 
uCertain it is that under usual circumstances 
it is inequitable and unjust to condemn a party 
unheard and that doubts should be resolved in 
favor of setting aside a default judgment to permit 
the parties to have their day in court. The author-
ities are uniform to that effect. It will be found, 
however, that these cases are predicated upon the 
hypothesis that there has been some mistake or ex-
cusable neglect on the part of the movant from 
which, in justice and equity, he should be relieved. 
The pertinent inquiry here is whether plaintiff met 
that requirement.'' (Emphasis added) 
Certainly the defendant has not met the requirement 
~s stated above. It is recognized that the moving party 
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should be diligent and show that he is prevented from 
avoiding a default judgment because of circumstances 
over which he had no control. In this regard the court 
states in Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Con~pany, et al (cited 
by defendant), 123 Utah 416, 260 P2d 741 and 743: 
t(Discretion must be exercised in furtherance 
of justice and the court will incline toward grant-
ing relief in a doubtful case to the end that the 
party may have a hearing. Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 
46, 276 P 908. However, the movant must show 
that he has used due diligence a.nd that he was pre-
vented from appearing by circumstances over 
which he had no control. Peterson v. Crosier, 29 
Utah 235, 81 P 860." (Emphasis added) 
The court goes on to say in the same case, Warren vs. 
Dixon Ranch Company: 
ccln order for this court to overturn the dis-· 
cretion of the lower court in refusing to vacate 
a valid judgment, the requirements of public policy 
demand more than a mere statement that a person 
did not have his day in court when full opportunity 
for a fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal 
representative." (Emphasis added) 
Attention is invited to the fact that in the case of 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Com.pany cited in appellant's 
brief, this court sustained the lower court's order denying 
the motion to set aside the default judgment. The de-
fendant there had much more to support his motion than 
exists in this case. There is not a single case that has been 
decided wherein the defendant has with full knowledge 
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of the service of Summons with the contents of the Sum-
mons and the contents of the Complaint and has refused 
to take any action and then has been successful in having 
the judgment set aside. In each instance where default 
judgment has been set aside there has been some special 
circumstance that has shown excusable neglect. See Kelly 
vs. Scott, 5 Utah 2d 159, 298 P2d 821, Ney vs. Harrison, 
5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P2d 1114, Utah Commercial Savings 
Bank vs. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198, 53 P 1033, and Locke vs. 
Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P2d 1111. 
Taylor vs. E. M. Royle Corporation 1 Utah 2d 175, 
264 P2d 279 (cited in defendants' brief as 264 P2d 880), 
does not support the question before the court. 
Plaintiff in that case sued on an express contract and 
without proof the lower court allowed recovery on quan-
tum meruit. The Supreme Court held an injustice would 
result if the rule were interpreted to charge the defendant 
with liability under quantum meruit, an issue he was never 
called upon to meet. 
The case of E. ]. Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite 
Company and Beaver Dam Sales C01nPany vs. Standard 
Gilsonite, 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P2d 951, was cited in 
defendants' brief. Service of Summons was made on 
the former president of defendant corporation who in-
formed the person serving that he was not an officer of 
the defendant corporation. The following excerpt from 
Justice Crockett's opinion is significant: 
ult is important to keep in mind that we are 
not here concerned with the rights of R. ]. Pinder 
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personally, but with those of stockholders in the 
corporation who seek an opportunity to assert their 
rights and protect their interests." 
Heathman vs. Fabian and Clendenin, 377 P2d 189, 
cited in defendants' brief is not in point as the question of 
the right of the court in its discretion to set aside a default 
judgment was not directly involved. The court stated 
immediately following the portion quoted as follows: 
celt was clearly the duty of the law firm to do 
what it could, acting fairly and openly, to prevent 
the court from entering a default judgment against 
Hatch without hearing its .claim that the default 
certificate was obtained on account of excusable 
neglect." 
Attention is also invited to the following cases: 
McWhirter vs. Donaldson et al, 36 Utah 293, 104 P 
731. In this case the defendant's attorney claimed that 
he had a verbal stipulation with the plaintiff's attorney to 
give additional time to answer. The court denied the 
motion to set aside judgment and this was affirmed on 
appeal. 
Peterson vs. Crozier, 29 Utah 235, 81 P 860. De-
fendant in this case was also represented by an attorney 
who filed an answer but did not appear for trial. De-
fendant at one time apparently intended to abandon 
his defense but thereafter tendered an amended answer 
and moved to set aside the judgment. The lower court 
den1ed the motion to set aside the judgment and this was 
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affirmed on appeal. The court on appeal said in part as 
follows: 
((In order to bring a case within the foregoing 
provision of the statute, the moving party must 
show that he has used due diligence to prepare 
and appear for trial and present his defense and 
that he was prevented from doing so because of 
some accident, misfortune or combination of cir-
cumstances over which he had no control. If, haw-
ever, the record discloses mere carelessness, lack of 
attention or indifference to his rights on the part 
of applicant or his counsel, he cannot expect an 
opportunity to redeem the past. If the party's 
negligence is without excuse or justification, he 
must abide the consequences." (Emphasis added) 
Bylund vs. Crook, 60 Utah 285, 208 P 504. The de-
fendant bank's motion to set aside default judgment was 
denied and this was affirmed on appeal. This was a fore-
closure suit in which the bank joined as a defendant 
because it held a second mortgage. It appeared that the 
bank knew of and encouraged the plaintiff in the fore-
closure proceedings right up to and including the sale 
of the property. 
The case of Masters vs. LeSuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 
P2d 573. The defendant was represented by an attorney 
who thought he had filed an answer. It appeared that 
before default judgment plaintiff's attorney called the 
defendant's attorney's attention to the fact that the mat-
ter was in default and that default judgment would be 
taken unless something was done. The order denying the 
motion to set aside default judgment was affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is submitted: 
That the trial court properly exercised its discretion 
in denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment as to de-
fendant Rex H. Cox. There is not a shred of evidence to 
show that there was any mistake, inadvertence, surprise 
or excusable neglect. As a matter of fact, defendant Rex 
H. Cox, by his own admission, had full knowledge of the 
bringing of suit, he had knowledge in the first place that 
it was going to be brought and yet he deliberately refused 
to carry out the direction in the Summons and present 
a defense. This is deliberate defiance of the court and 
now he asks the court to exercise its discretion in setting 
it aside. 
ntn The judgment of the lower court refusing to set aside 
d~, the default judgment against Rex H. Cox should be 
ro~ sustained. 
McKAY AND BURTON 
By REED H. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
